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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines traditional jury selection procedures and suggests there is a 
failure to deal with bias in juries. Judicial support for the current system remains 
strong in New Zealand however Canadian courts, and to a minor extent English 
courts, are adopting a new, more comprehensive, approach to jury selection. The 
United States has a history of focusing far more seriously on the selection of the 
jury and has evolved a system of Scientific Jury Selection. This system is still 
developing and is the subject of controversy. This paper explores the origins of 
Scientific Jury Selection, its components as they are developing and the evidence it 
can provide as to its efficacy. It is suggested that, from an efficacy standpoint, 
Scientific Jury Selection is a valid, if imperfect, alternative to New Zealand's present 
selection process. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (exluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 15,400 words. 
INTRODUCTION 
Lord Devlin has provided one of the most eloquent and powerful statements 
in jury-related literature, highlighting the importance of the jury in society.1 
Each jury is a little parliament. The jury sense is the parliamentary sense. 
cannot see the one dying and the other surviving. The first object of any 
tyrant in Whitehall would be to make Parliament utterly subservient to his 
will ; and the next to overthrow or diminish trial by jury, for no tyrant could 
afford to leave a subject 's freedom in the hands of twelve of his 
countrymen . So that trial by jury is more than an instrument of justice and 
more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that shows that 
freedom lives. 
New Zealand 's recent Parliamentary changes focused on the election of 
Parliament. This paper focuses on the selection of juries. Does the lamp 
that shows that freedom lives burn brightly in New Zealand? This question 
is addressed in legislative, judicial and practical terms. Could the lamp burn 
more brightly? The answer is considered in terms of an alternative to 
current methods of Jury Selection. The major alternative is a process 
known as Scientific Jury Selection ("SJS"). SJS will be explained and 
explored in depth throughout the paper but in brief it is a conglomeration of 
techniques, mainly taken from the social science field (particularly 
psychology and sociology) which attempt to ensure that the jury is made of 
preferred members. Two questions immediately arise: does SJS work and 
should SJS be allowed to work? For SJS to fan the flame of the lamp that 
shows that freedom lives both questions must be answered in the 
affirmative. This paper addresses the first of these questions. 2 Evidence 
as to efficacy of SJS is presented here in terms of actual trials and of 
academic studies. An attempt is made throughout to provide a balanced 
approach . Indeed, as SJS develops so too does the evidence in relation to 
its efficacy. To date the answer is somewhat equivocal and room is 
available for valid argument on both sides. Although the jury is still out on 
1 Sir P Devlin Trial by Jury (Stevens & Sons, London , 1966) 164. 
2 The issues surrounding the ethics of SJS are equally fascinating . They are 
comprehensively addressed in the following texts: J Abramson We, the Jury (BasicBooks, A 
Division of HarperCollinsPublishers, Inc., New York) 1994; JW Barber "The Jury is Still Out: 
The Role of Jury Science in the Modern American Courtroom" (1994) 31 ACLR 1225; JA 
Tanford and S Tanford "Better Trials Through Science: A Defence of Psychologist-Lawyer 
Collaboration" (1988) 66 NCL Rev 7 41 ; D Sahler "Scientifically Selecting Jurors While 
Maintaining Professional Responsibility: A Proposed Model Rule" (1996) 6 Alb. LJ Sci. & 
Tech. 383; DP Stolle, J K Robbennolt, R L Wiener "The Perceived Fairness of the 
Psychologist Trial Consultant: An Empirical Investigation" (1996) 20 Law & Psychol Rev 
139. 
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this question, it is clear that SJS is a potentially powerful tool that should not 
be ignored. 
II JURY SELECTION IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Legislative Authority 
In New Zealand that lamp is fuelled by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1992 which states that: 
24. Everyone who is charged with an offence ... 
(e) Shall have the right , except in the case of an offence under military 
law tried before a military tribunal , to the benefit of a trial by jury 
when the penalty for the offence is or includes imprisonment for 
more than three months; 
and that: 
25. Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the 
determination of the charge, the following minimum rights: 
(a) The right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial court ... 
New Zealand legislation provides two opportunities for an accused to 
ensure the jury which hears his or her case is independent and impartial. 
The first is set out in section 24(1) of the Juries Act 1981 : 
Subject to the succeeding provisions of this section3, in every case to be 
tried before a jury each of the parties shall be entitled to challenge without 
cause 6 jurors only.4 
The second is provided in section 25(1 ):5 
... each party to the proceedings shall be entitled to any number of 
challenges for cause on the ground that a juror is not indifferent between 
the parties. 
Section 22 of the Juries Act allows the judge to discharge any juror who he 
or she feels is not disinterested in the facts or who might be closely 
connected with one of the parties or with one of the witnesses. 
3 Subsection 2 provides for the prosecution to challenge without cause 12 jurors where the 
cases of multiple defendants are heard together. 
4 In addition the Crown formerly had the right , now a consensual procedure, or dependent 
on a Judge's own motion , to require jurors to stand aside s27 of the Juries Act. 
5 Juries Act 1981 . 
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The second of these opportunities, challenges for cause, have been "rare in 
New Zealand and [t]he course of supporting a challenge for cause by 
examination by counsel of a juror before he or she is seated in the jury box 
is still rarer. "6 In fact examination to support a challenge for cause has, as 
far as Williamson J or the Appeal Court judges in R v Sanders7 were aware, 
never occurred in New Zealand. 
A Judicial Approach 
1 The Status Quo 
In the recent decision of R v Sanders8 Cooke P, delivering the judgment on 
behalf of Richardson , Casey, Hardie Boys and McKay JJ, sets out the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal 's stance on jury selection . 
Cooke P approves the English requirement whereby a party must establish 
a foundation in fact in support of a challenge for cause before a juror can 
be cross-examined as to potential bias.9 He notes that cross-examination 
of jurors did occur in the English case of R v Kray10 but that that was a case 
described by the judge and textbooks as "wholly exceptional". 11 
Cooke then applies this "wholly exceptional" test to New Zealand cases: 12 
One can only remain unconvinced that any novelty should be introduced 
into ordinary New Zealand criminal practice, while recognising that in wholly 
exceptional cases a trial Judge may properly exercise the judicial discretion 
of allowing jurors, whose names have been called , to be cross-examined 
before taking their seats. 
Therefore any person who is called as a juror in New Zealand is presumed 
to be able to deliver fair and impartial judgment unless the circumstances 
are "wholly exceptional". 
The circumstances of Sanders were that the accused "is or was" a 
prominent member of the Road Knights motor cycle gang or club"13 and 
that: 14 
6 [1995] 3 NZLR 545, 549. 
7 Above n 6. 
8 [1995] 3 NZLR 545 . 
9 R v Chandler (No 2) [1964] 2 QB 322, 338. 
10 (1969) 53 Cr App R 412. 
11 Above n 8. 
12 Above n 8, 550. 
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In 1991 and 1992 there had been much adverse publicity in Timaru , 
reflected in public meetings, about the violent criminal conduct of the motor 
cycle gangs. The discovery in 1992 of cannabis-growing on or adjacent to 
the accused 's farm also figured in local media publicity, and in the context 
of anti-gang concern . Thereafter, on the material placed before the Court, 
the publicity and the concern gradually diminished , to the extent that on 27 
October 1993 the Police Minister was reported as saying that there was no 
longer a gang problem in Timaru . 
In May 1993 the appellant was tried before a Timaru District Court Judge 
and jury on five drug charges. The appellant was denied his application for 
a change of venue on the ground of adverse newspaper and radio publicity. 
The jury did not agree on a verdict. The case was re-tried before a High 
Court Judge and jury in Timaru in May 1994. Counsel for the appellant 
decided , in light of the previous unsuccessful application for a change of 
venue, to apply to the presiding High Court judge for an order permitting 
counsel to examine each prospective juror for cause. 
Williamson J heard the application and dismissed it on the basis that he 
was:15 
[N]ot satisfied that the publicity relating to the accused and to the Road 
Knights motor cycle club had been shown to have the potential effect of 
destroying prospective jurors' indifference, or that it would have so clogged 
a potential juror's mind with prejudice that he or she would be unable to try 
the case impartially. 
Cooke J apparently approved of this statement. Williamson J's bias 
requirement, however, seems somewhat more extreme, at least in its 
descriptive language, than the plain "not indifferent" enacted in section 22 
of the Juries Act. 16 Indeed the meaning of "indifference" must be 
interpreted in light of the presumption of innocence which: 17 
[D]emands that [jurors] be biased in favour of the accused . It is the state's 
obligation to overcome this institutionally created bias in favour of the 
defendant by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
13 Above n 8, 548. 
14 Above n 6. 
15 Above n 13. 
16 Section 22 is also more consistent with the requirement as described by Doherty JA, 
reflecting American jurisprudence, in R v Parks 84 CCC (3d) 353, 364 (1993) : "A juror's 
biases will only render him or her partial if they will impact on the decision reached by that 
juror in a manner which is immiscible with the duty to render a verdict based only on the 
evidence and an application of the law as provided by the trial judge." 
17 JJ Gobert "In Search of the Impartial Jury" (1988) 79 JCrimL & Criminology 269, 276. 
This presumption was recognised in R v Parks, above n 16. 
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The jury in Sanders ' re-trial found him guilty on five drug-related counts 
after he pleaded guilty to the first of six counts in the indictment. The 
appellant then appealed against conviction and sentence, essentially to 
challenge the pre-trial ruling denying the application to allow examination of 
prospective jurors. 
As stated above, 18 the Appeal Court found that the circumstances in 
Sanders were not "wholly exceptional". Cooke P gave reasons why the 
opportunity to examine for cause should be limited to wholly exceptional 
cases . 
One of the reasons noted was that, as Australian courts have commented , 
detection of bias is difficult: 19 
It seems unlikely that a prejudiced juror would recognise his own personal 
prejudice - or, knowing it, would admit it. However, since there are no 
empirical data to contradict his declaration of detachment, his word is 
ordinarily the determining factor. What is more, the more prejudiced or 
bigoted the jurors, the less can they be expected to confess forthrightly and 
candidly their state of mind in open court. 
Brennan J, in Murphy, also suggests that questioning and disqualifying 
jurors who admit to bias may produce the negative effect of leading "jurors 
to think that the community's confidence in their impartiality and sense of 
responsibility is heavily qualified ."20 
Cooke P adopts the Australian view that better methods exist for mollifying 
or abating bias. One of these is to delay the trial until publicity has 
diminished or, alternatively appropriate directions warning against bias may 
be given by the judge. A change of venue may also be appropriate.21 
Although, of course, a change of venue was refused for Sanders' first trial. 
In essence, Cooke P sums up examination of jurors as to cause as being 
"intrusive and quite possibly fruitless". 22 He does not elucidate on what 
18 Above n 12. 
19 Mason CJ and Toohey J in a joint judgment, Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94, 103-104. 
20 Above n 12. 
21 Above n 8, 551 . 
22 Above n 8. 
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circumstances might define a "wholly exceptional" case and so merit such a 
dubious course. If there were one, it is difficult to imagine what questions 
might be allowed because Cooke unceremoniously dismisses the questions 
that counsel suggested in Sanders.23 
It is hardly necessary to do more than to reproduce that list [of potential jury 
questions] to bring out the intrusive, inconclusive, and time-consuming 
inquiries which an inquisition of that kind would introduce into jury balloting. 
New Zealand law should not go down that road. 
So, although challenge for cause is legislatively available in New Zealand it 
has not hitherto been available in practice, particularly if required to be 
supported by examination of jurors. Therefore the only method available to 
counsel to attempt to secure an accused's right to an independent and 
impartial jury is by means of peremptory challenges. 
2 Challenging the Status Quo 
Cooke P noted in Sanders that while Canadian courts did not apparently 
"share fully the reluctance of English, Australian and New Zealand Courts to 
allow "intrusive and quite possibly fruitless cross-examination of potential 
jurors", there was no in-depth discussion of the subject by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The significant case not available to him, and which 
speaks to many of his objections, was Regina v Parks. 24 
In R v Parks, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the appeal of a black drug-
dealer accused for the manslaughter of a white cocaine user. The 
conviction was quashed and a new trial was ordered on the basis that: 25 
[T]he appellant was denied his statutory right to challenge for cause. That 
right is essential to the appearance of fairness and the integrity of the trial. 
In this case the trial judge had refused to allow defence counsel to ask 
jurors two questions:26 
(1) In spite of the judge's direction [to judge without bias, prejudice or 
partiality] would your ability to judge witnesses without bias, 
23 Above n 21 , 551 . The questions are presented in Appendix A. The issues to which they 
refer are highlighted currently by moves toward providing witness protection through 
anonymity in gang-related cases. 
24 Above n 16. 
25 Above n 16, 380. 
26 Above n 16, 359 
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prejudice or partiality be affected by the fact that there are people 
involved in cocaine and other drugs? 
(2) Would your ability to judge the evidence in the case without bias, 
prejudice or partiality be affected by the fact that the person 
charged is a black Jamaican immigrant and the deceased is a white 
man? 
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's refusal of the first question 
because the witness' involvement in the drug trade and his or her personal 
use of illicit drugs could be properly considered by the jury in its assessment 
of the credibility and reliability of witnesses. 
The reference to "Jamaican immigrant" was also agreed to be inappropriate 
for counsel to refer to as there was no indication that the accused 's 
nationality or immigration status would be relevant or made known to the 
jury. The question without this reference, however, was held to be a valid 
question to be put to the jury. 27 
The trial judge had denied counsel the opportunity to put the original 
questions on a very similar basis to that used in Sanders; that is, the 
presumption that duly chosen and sworn jurors could be relied on to do their 
duty and to decide the case without regard to personal biases and 
prejudice. Doherty JA, delivering the judgment in the Ontario Court of 
Appeal , also recognises this presumption. He considers that the case 
surpassed the limits of this presumption, which limits he draws from R v 
Sherratt:28 
The threshold question is not whether the ground of alleged partiality will 
create such partiality in [a] juror; but rather whether it could create that 
partiality which would prevent a juror from being indifferent as to the result. 
In the end, there must exist a realistic potential for the existence of 
partiality, on a ground sufficiently articulated in the application, before the 
challenger should be allowed to proceed . 
Doherty JA was presented with , and cited, a number of sources recognising 
that racism exists in Toronto and Canada generally. He found, however, 
that even though the trial judge had not had the benefit of any of these 
sources he should have allowed the jury to be questioned as to possible 
27 In R v Willis (1994) , 90 CCC (3d) 353 at 379-380 (Ont. C.A.) a similar question, but with 
emphasis on Jamaican immigrants rather than simply black persons was approved by the 
Court of Appeal. 
28 (1991), 63 CCC (3d) 193, 212. 
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bias resulting from race. In determining whether grounds for the application 
had been "sufficiently articulated" he adopted the test set out in Sherratt 
that: 29 
[W]hile there must be an "air of reality" to the application , it need not be an 
"extreme" case ... 
Trial counsel in Parks, like counsel in Sanders offered little evidence to 
support their request to allow examination of jurors. OM Tanovich suggests 
appropriate supporting evidence in Canadian settings are supplied by:30 
(a) calling viva voce expert opinion evidence; 
(b) presenting the results of mock jury studies, opinions and studies of 
experts, newspaper articles; 
(c) relying on previous judicial decisions; or 
(d) relying on the number of successful challenges in similar cases . 
Cooke P in Sanders was presented with American and Canadian studies 
which he said the Court did "not overlook but, in relation to laying a 
foundation for challenge, the Court once again adopts the "exceptional" 
test: 31 
There may be cases where a reading by the trial judge of offending 
material , where it has been published in circumstances that justify an 
inference that members of the jury are likely to have read it and to have 
been influenced against the accused , will be enough to justify acceding to 
an application to question potential jurors. But they are exceptional cases. 
Parks and Sanders also disagree on a number of other points. Where 
Cooke P objects to questioning on the basis that the sometimes hidden 
nature of bias makes it difficult to detect, Doherty JA suggests that the more 
unconscious a bias is the more resistant it will prove to "judicial cleansing" 
by post-jury selection safeguards such as a trial judge's warning and the 
taking of the oath. 32 
29 Above n 28, 211 . 
30 OM Tanovich , "Rethinking Jury Selection : Challenges for Cause and Peremptory 
Challenges" (1994) 30 Cr (4th) 310, 321 . 
31 Above n 6. 
32 Above n 16, 371 . 
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Where Cooke J notes the negative effect of questioning jurors Doherty JA 
simply states that answering the question requested in Parks was no "cost" 
to the prospective juror:33 
He or she should not be embarrassed by the question; nor can the question 
realistically be seen as an intrusion into a juror's privacy. 
Indeed, Doherty JA's view was that the jurors would benefit from the 
question in the same way as with a direction from the judge, in that they 
would be sensitised from the outset of the proceedings to the need to 
confront potential racial bias and censure it to stop it impacting on their 
verdict. The merit of this view is, however, undermined by his earlier 
suggestion as to the inadequacy of directions from the judge. 
The issue in Sanders was one of pre-trial publicity and also, possibly, the 
prejudice associated with being a member of a motor cycle gang or club. 
Although "pre-trial publicity" and "race" are quite distinct issues and Doherty 
JA deals specifically with "race" he relies for his test upon a "pre-trial 
publicity" case and does not draw a distinction between the two issues but 
rather sits them alongside one another without comment. 34 
Just as the mere existence of prejudicial pre-trial publicity does not give an 
automatic right to challenge for cause, the existence of racial prejudice 
within the community from which jurors are drawn does not entitle an 
accused to challenge for cause. 
Prejudice relating to the accused's membership of the motor cycle 
club/gang is a different issue. Whether or not the Court would consider it 
an appropriate factor for the jury to consider in assessing the witnesses, as 
was the dealing in drugs in Parks or whether it would be inappropriate, akin 
to race in Parks, has not been raised in New Zealand. Indeed, the reliance 
on peremptory challenges ensures that the New Zealand jurisprudence 
relating to juror bias is limited. 35 
33 Above n 16, 379 
34 Above n 16, 365. FA Cacchione J Challenge for Cause discusses the bias arising in 
different situations and of challenge for cause generally in Canada in an unpublished paper 
presented for the National Criminal Law Program, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 
July 1995. 
35 Extensive questioning in challenging for cause was recently allowed in a recent Canadian 
case involving rape by a motor cycle club member. Regina v Hill (Unreported). Noted in 
Challenge for Cause above n 34. The questions allowed in that case are listed in Appendix 
B. 
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Perhaps even more threatening to the status quo is a recent English 
decision by Phillips LJ . He outlines his course, and cause, of action in a 
recent article addressing the issue of challenge for cause.36 After briefly 
outlining the English situation , where peremptory challenges were abolished 
in 1988 to avoid bias to the defendant, he describes a new phenomenon of 
successful applications for a stay of criminal proceedings on the ground that 
the trial would constitute an abuse of process because adverse publicity 
has been so intense that the members of any jury selected are likely to be 
infected by prejudice against the defendant. 
In the face of an application for a stay on the ground of adverse publicity 
Phillips LJ describes how he recently:37 
[A]dopted a course that was without precedent. I settled, with the help of 
counsel , a questionnaire designed to identify those potential jurors who 
might be prejudiced as the result of the media coverage. Each member of 
the panel from which the jury would be selected was required to complete 
this questionnaire. The potential jurors were kept out of court when the 
selection ballot took place. As each juror was selected I considered his or 
her questionnaire with counsel and then questioned the juror to explore any 
possibility of prejudice suggested by the questionnaire. 
Phillips LJ does not describe his case as being "wholly exceptional". Indeed, 
he notes that he took the course he did because there had been four recent 
cases where stays had been granted on the basis that "adverse publicity has 
been so intense that members of any jury selected were likely to be infected 
by prejudice".38 He notes that the questions he allowed were similar to those 
that were described by Cooke P as "intrusive, inconclusive and time-
consuming" in Sanders. Of particular interest is the fact that answers to the 
questions led him to excuse from serving "close on 50% of those selected". 
While expressly stating he does not view the practice of "American style jury 
selection" as being desirable, he sees the process he adopted, which he 
recognises has since been followed at least once, as preferable to a stay of 
proceedings on the ground that there can be no fair trial. 
The acknowledgment Phillips LJ made, which the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal is most reluctant to make, is that pre-trial publicity produced a valid 
impediment to an accused's right to a fair trial. Phillips LJ had the 
36 Phillips LJ "Challenge for Cause" (1996) 26 VUWLR 481 . Phillips LJ does not cite the 
trial in question , nor is it noted in major legal data bases. 
37 .Above n 36, 483. 
38 Above n 36. 
10 
advantage, unlike Cooke P, however, of extensive Gallup poll evidence of 
the affect of publicity surrounding the case on the attitude to the defendants 
of those questioned. 
B Process in Action 
The only comprehensive research done on juries in New Zealand is a 
Justice Department study called Trial by Peers? The Composition of New 
Zealand Juries. 39 The results provide a less than reassuring picture for a 
defendant, a victim or the community at large who presumes or hopes that 
trial by jury will be before an independent and impartial court or, as the 
study particularly addressed, the popular conception of a jury of peers. 
The diagram below indicates the points in the jury selection process where 
people living in New Zealand are excluded from serving on a jury.40 
39 Department of Justice New Zealand, S Dunstan, J Pualin , K Atkinson (Department of 
Justice, Wellington, 1995). This study covered all people summonsed for jury service at all 
District and High Courts throughout New Zealand for trials starting during the period of 13 
September to 8 October 1993 inclusive. It involved 99 District Court and 35 High Court 
trials. In addition, 12 judges, 24 counsel and 13 court staff, all selected for extensive trial 
experience, were interviewed for approximately 45 minutes as to their perceptions about 
jury selection practices in New Zealand. 
40 Above n 39, 167. 
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While comment may be made about each exclusion point, 41 this paper 
addresses the exclusions that stem from challenges. The chart above does 
not distinguish between peremptory challenges and challenges for cause 
because, as noted above, challenges in New Zealand almost exclusively 
take the form of peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges are used 
quite enthusiastically by the defence who are twice as likely to challenge as 
the prosecution. During the course of the study just over one third of all 
jurors balloted were challenged. 42 
Almost all defence counsel commented that the chalienge was used to 
minimise any prejudice that may arise against their client. Prosecution 
counsel expressed a slightly wider view of challenging non-representative, 
unsuitable or inappropriate people. One prosecution counsel described the 
aim as:43 
... you're avoiding sort of the extreme, and sort of getting back to some 
rational , reasonable , common sense, average straight out member of the 
community. To weed out [the] strange. 
A variety of means are used by counsel to determine who are the "strange" 
to be weeded out from the jury panel. A list of potential jurors is generally 
made available to counsel on the Wednesday or Thursday in the week prior 
to the trial. Clearly this leaves little time to assess potential jurors and on 
some occasions counsel do not bother to uplift the list until the day of the 
trial. 
In all areas except one major city the police routinely use the Wanganui 
computer to provide the prosecution with information on potential jurors' 
previous convictions . The officer in charge of the case sometimes looks 
through the prosecution's jury list to see if there is anybody he or she does 
not want on the jury. The conviction list may also be used to determine who 
is "desirable". One prosecution counsel , for instance, commented :44 
Well, a person who is using cannabis himself, and has a previous 
conviction , is not going to accept that a person who has got ten pounds of 
cannabis that it's all for his own use. So that's an advantage to me I think . 
. . . It's nice to have someone on your jury who knows something about it. 
41 Refer above n 39. 
42 Above n 39, 66. 
43 Above n 39, 101 . 
44 Above n 39, 111 . 
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The defence, on the other hand, did little jury vetting owing largely to a lack 
of resources. Indeed concern was raised that the difference in ability to vet 
the jury lists gave an unfair advantage to the prosecution .45 Counsel would 
go through the jury list with their client to see if any person should be 
excluded. At times information from the jury list was also discussed, 
particularly gender, occupation and address. 
One of the judges described the results in terms which express essentially 
this writer's main objection to the current system:46 
I think it's a lottery. I think that it's resonant with misconceptions by both 
prosecution and defence. Neither of them know really very much about the 
jurors at all. I think it's embarrassing to a lot of people who have been 
challenged even though they tell you not to worry about it. Most of the 
challenges are on the basis of prejudicially held views. 
These views are based on stereotypes relating to readily observable 
features such as address, ethnicity, occupation and gender. Challenging is 
sometimes also based on background information obtained through various 
sources that happen to be available. This option is particularly available to 
counsel in small towns. One judge noted that as defence counsel he had 
used well positioned female hairdressers as a particularly good source of 
information. 
The issue this writer has about the method of challenging in New Zealand is 
not as to the reasons for challenging per se47 but to how the undesirable or 
"strange" jurors are identified. 
The results of these ill-informed challenges are described in the above 
diagram in the two boxes labelled "Prosecution Challenges" and "Defence 
Challenges". Of particular note are the figures relating to Maori. Counsel 
for the prosecution challenged Maori men more than any other group. They 
45 K Ryan Justice Without Fear (Hodder, Moa, Beckett Publishers Limited , Auckland , 1997) 
raises this issue in relation to the trial which initially convicted Arthur Allan Thomas. 
46 Above n 39, 142. 
47 The desirability for a jury to be impartial and/or composed of peers is another topic. The 
Justice Department study, as evidenced from its title , almost presumes a goal of "peers" 
while much , particularly American , writing argues for impartiality. For discussion on this see 
J Abramson We, the Jury (BasicBooks, A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., New 
York, 1994), a text strongly against selection for "peers". The compatibility of the two 
concepts is discussed in JW Barber "The Jury is Still Out: The Role of Jury Science in the 
Modern American Courtroom" 31 ACLR 1225 (1994) . 
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were twice as likely to challenge balloted Maori compared with non-Maori in 
the High Court, and nearly three times as likely to challenge Maori in the 
District Court. In the District Court, close to every second balloted Maori 
male was challenged . This challenging pattern rests on a number factors 
including: a higher proportion with previous criminal convictions and 
sympathy for a Maori defendant, particularly if there was also a peer 
relationship of some kind . One counsel explained that a Maori juror might 
have "disproportionate empathy for [the defendant] and not enough 
objectivity". The study does not note if that counsel considered whether a 
potential juror from a different ethnic, age and socio-economic group might 
have disproportionate antipathy for the defendant and not enough 
objectivity. The defence apparently think this is so because they will 
challenge all other groups more frequently than Maori men. 48 
Interestingly, in light of the results, two of the judges in the study 
commented that they had never seen any sign of calculated challenge of 
Maori by either prosecution or defence counsel. 49 However, as a result of 
the findings of this study the Solicitor General directed all crown solicitors to 
"take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that male Maori jurors are not 
disproportionately challenged by the Crown".50 The president of the 
Wellington District Law Society (who is also a member of the crown 
solicitors' panel) echoed the judges' comments above in saying that he 
could see no reason for the edict. He said that challenges by the Crown 
were usually because of concern that the person might not be impartial and 
that, "In my experience it has nothing to do with race whatsoever.". 
This lack of recognition of what the research clearly indicates in itself 
highlights the pervasive nature of bias in New Zealand courts. 
48 For an extensive review of the issues surrounding empathy and race see DO Linder 
"Juror Empathy and Race" (1996) 63 Tenn L Rev 887 . For a more general discussion of 
race and jury selection se BJ Serr and M Maney ''Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the 
Democratic Jury: the Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance" (1988) 79 JCrimlaw & 
Criminology 1. 
4
" Above n 39 , 137. 
',o "Crown counsel receives Juries edict - Maori males 'disproportionately challenged" New 
Zealand Horald, New Zealand, 6 November 1995, 2 
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The strengths of the present system of jury selection were considered by 
the study participants to be encompassed by the following four points:51 
(a) the peremptory challenge gave the accused an ability to exercise an 
opinion about who should judge his or her case; 
(b) because each side had equal challenges, biases were balanced out 
and a fair representation of people on the jury was likely; 
(c) the peremptory challenge offered scope for removing extreme points 
of view from either end of the spectrum; 
(d) not having to give account of the reason why a potential juror was 
challenged was a strength . 
Inherent in the first three of these perceived strengths is the ability of 
counsel to be able to identify a biased juror. However respondents noted 
that two of the weaknesses of the present system were:52 
(a) the defence often had to resort to assumptions, as they had very 
little information on which to base a challenge; and 
(b) challenges by the prosecution and defence could be based on 
stereotypes. 
The weaknesses, therefore, undermine the three strengths while the fourth 
perceived strength simply enhances counsels' opportunity to rely on 
stereotypes. 
The Sanders' approach seems to be to deny that biased jurors exist, or at 
least jurors who are biased to the extent of denying the accused's right to 
an impartial jury. If there happens to be such a biased juror, the Court 
determines that they would only be present in a "wholly exceptional" case. 
51 Above n 39, 141 . 
52 Above n 39, 142. 
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Just as Cooke P notes that the necessity for and preferability of New 
Zealand's minimalist method of jury selection is self-evident,53 in the United 
States the opposite is believed to be just as self-evident: 54 
[S]ubconscious, as well as express, racial fears and hatred operate to deny 
fairness to the person despised ; that is why we seek to ensure that the right 
to an impartial jury is a meaningful right by providing the defense with the 
opportunity to ask prospective jurors questions designed to expose even 
hidden prejudices ... [M]ight not the ... juror be influenced by those same 
prejudices in deciding whether, for example, to credit or discredit white 
witnesses as opposed to black witnesses ... 
Traditionally jury selection in the United States has involved similar 
techniques as apply in New Zealand. Unlike New Zealand , the United 
States has incorporated these with voir dire in the form of cross-
examination before challenges are made. However, in the last thirty years 
a method for jury selection has been developing which attempts to avoid 
reliance on traditional stereotypes. Originally called "Systematic Jury 
Selection, now called "Scientific Jury Selection this is a new, still formulating 
and rather nebulous collection of tools for selecting a jury. The balance of 
this paper considers the evidence of its efficacy to date. 
Ill SCIENTIFIC JURY SELECTION: A CONVINCING ALTERNATIVE? 
A The Originating Instance - The Berrigan Trial 
1 SJS effected 
SJS began against the turbulent backdrop of America's participation in the 
Vietnam War. In late November 1970, J. Edgar Hoover appealed to 
Congress for additional funds to control antiwar protesters and militants. He 
said the "East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives" was plotting , amongst other 
things, to kidnap a "highly placed Government official" (Henry Kissinger) . 
The "accused" were a group of Catholic priests , nuns and students who 
protested against the Vietnam War. Hoover named Philip and Daniel 
Berrigan, Catholic priests, as principal leaders of the plot. These two, along 
with other members of the group, had conducted more than 25 raids to 
destroy draft board records and generally protested about the Vietnam war. 
Both Berrigans were already serving prison sentences for these activities. 
In prison they continued to protest by sending out antiwar messages, 
53 Above n 21 . 
54 Turner v Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 40 (1986). 
17 
recruiting convicts to their cause and staying in contact with other 
protesters. 
The Justice Department chose Harrisburg, Pennsylvania , an area known to 
be politically conservative, for the trial ; the presiding judge was a recent 
Nixon appointee and the prosecution case hinged on the testimony and 
credibility of an FBI informer who had smuggled letters between two of the 
accused. 
Jay Schulman, an antiwar social scientist, along with a coalition of social 
scientists, activists and others with strong antiwar feelings , felt that the 
above circumstances made it unlikely that the defendants would be 
presumed innocent and so receive a fair trial. 55 
Although the Berrigan trial is generally regarded as the originating Scientific 
Jury Selection trial the methods used and findings from are remarkably 
similar to today. The information garnered from this case is particularly 
valuable as it involves real jurors who heard real evidence, in distinction 
from most studies about juror behaviour. The down side, however, is that 
there is no control group for comparisons. 
Schulman et al began their research with a phone survey collecting 
demographic characteristics. From this the team discovered that the 
members of the random sample were, on the average, younger than people 
in the available panel (and therefore the panel was more likely to favour the 
prosecution) . Partly on the basis of this evidence the Judge agreed to the 
selection of a new, more representative panel from which to select a jury. 
252 people from the phone survey were then chosen for their likely 
similarity to the eventual panel and were re-contacted for further indepth 
interviews. The focus of these interviews was on issues it was felt would be 
relevant to a juror's attitudes and the ability to be impartial. 
55 The description of events outlined here is taken from J Schulman , P Shaver, R Colman, B 
Emrich, and R Christie "Recipe for a Jury" (May 1973) Psychology Today 37. 
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The next step, the voir dire, is the interviewing of the potential jurors before 
they are accepted as jurors. This is the step which was, and remains, 
crucial to an application of SJS. Indeed one group of SJS researchers 
describe SJS as a new method of voir dire.56 
On the first day of the trial the judge questioned the panel of jurors as a 
group, focusing primarily on their biases, exposure to pre-trial publicity, and 
their varied reasons for not wanting to serve on the jury. Many people 
excused themselves immediately. This was often on the grounds that they 
had read about the trial and already had some thoughts about it. The 
defence expected from the survey, and confirmed in phone calls to 20 of 
the jurors who had excused themselves, that these jurors would favour the 
prosecution ; 14 admitted they were biased against the defendants, 1 biased 
for, and 5 refused to answer the question.57 
If a person passed the judge's questioning, the prosecutor then asked a few 
questions. The defence asked their questions based on the responses 
from the survey. The survey had indicated that 4 out of 5 people in the 
area would be opposed to the defendants so the SJS team advised counsel 
that it was important to question the jury panel for as long as possible in 
order to challenge as many for cause as possible so that the pool of jurors 
remaining would present a much more favourable mix. The judge excused 
22 people for probable bias against the defence. Only two were excused at 
the request of the prosecution . 
After each court session the defence discussed and rated prospective 
jurors on a one-to-five scale with 'one' being very good for the defence, 
'five' very bad. These ratings were taken on the basis of the surveys, the 
answers at voir dire, behavioural cues, and, through one of the lawyer's 
56 G Moran , BL Cutler and A De Lisa "Attitudes Toward Tort Reform , Scientific Jury 
Selection , and Juror bias: Verdict Inclination in Criminal and Civil Trials" (1994) 18 Law and 
Psychol Rev 309, 312. The pre-eminence of voir dire in SJS is particularly problematic in 
New Zealand because voir dire seems to be only legislatively available here. 
57 As with the use of voir dire, this is at wide variance with the practice in New Zealand. 
Here potential jurors are asked simply to inform the judge or registrar if they recognise any 
of the parties or witnesses involved in the case. A list is usually read of the prosecution 
witnesses but only occasionally of the defence witnesses. No inquiry is made as to any 
other bias. A potential juror, therefore , has little opportunity to excuse themselves even 
although they might understand themselves to be unable to judge the case fairly. 
19 
extensive community and legal contacts, "third party" information on the 
backgrounds and attitudes of prospective jurors. 
Common sense, and no doubt the traditional stereotype method, predicted 
those jurors who would be most favourable to the defence. This is apparent 
because prosecution, operating without any social science advice, used 
their six peremptory challenges to remove six of the defence's 'ones' . 
Difficulty came for the defence when they had to decide who to leave on 
from the 15 jurors they had rated as 'three'. Considerations taken into 
account in this phase were: choosing between variances in an individual 
jurors' demographics and voir dire response; group dynamics; likely 
foreman; and gender mix. 
During the trial the Government presented 64 witnesses, only one of whom 
was crucial to the kidnap-bombing charge. At the end of the Government's 
case the lead defence lawyer argued for a directed verdict of acquittal , on 
the grounds that the Government had presented "such flimsy evidence". 
This motion was denied. The defence called no evidence. The jurors 
deliberated for seven days. The principal charges of conspiracy were hung: 
1 O for acquittal , two for guilty. The charge of smuggling letters was found 
proved. The Government did not retry the case. 
2 SJS affects 
The frustrating yet inevitable part of SJS is that in real situations there is not 
control group so it is impossible to scientifically "prove" that the use of SJS 
has led to a conviction or acquittal or even to what extent it has impacted on 
the verdict. Taking this into account, a number of factors for and against 
the "success" of scientific jury selection can be argued in this case. 
Those who deny the efficacy of SJS would argue the general points that are 
usually raised in any instance; that the jurors did not find the charge very 
clear or easy to understand, the evidence was weak,58 and that the defence 
team were dedicated and very well prepared. More specifically, critics can 
58 J Abramson , above n 47, describes the evidence as "extremely weak, bordering on the 
ridiculous", 158. 
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point to the errors made by the team in choosing the two jurors who insisted 
that the accused were guilty. Schulman himself acknowledges that:59 
We were faced with a tragic irony. While we had argued and debated for 
hours about third-choice jurors, it was two of our second choices who hung 
the jury. 
Given these possible weaknesses, however, the SJS team can still present 
a convincing argument that they contributed to the success of the defence. 
The original phone survey provided evidence which in turn produced a more 
representative, and also more defence-favourable, pool of jurors 
The survey indicated a factor that was counter-intuitive. Education and 
contact with metropolitan news media usually were linked to liberal attitudes 
and therefore a tendency to favour the defence. However, it was 
discovered liberal college-educated people and younger college graduates 
tended to leave Harrisburg and the college-educated who elected to live 
there were more likely to be Republicans, businessmen, members of local 
civic organisations, and read conservative magazines as well as 
metropolitan newspapers. 
The original survey indicated that people living in the area had an unusually 
high level of trust in government. The national level of trust was 45 to 50% 
compared to 80% in Harrisburg. This naturally augured badly for 
defendants who were participants in anti-Government activities. 
The generally negative bias towards the accused was further established by 
the defence team in further research while the jury was deliberating. Re-
interviews of 83 people from the in-depth interview who roughly matched 
the actual jurors indicated that nearly all believed the defendants were guilty 
of conspiracy to raid draft boards; and guilty of one or both of the other 
charges. Only one respondent said the defendants were guilty of none of 
the charges. The argument that SJS had avoided an overwhelmingly pro-
conviction population , however, cannot be taken too far: these respondents 
did not hear all the evidence and cross-examination and, unlike the actual 
59 Above n 55, 79. 
21 
jurors, were exposed to publicity and general public discussion during the 
course of the trial. 
The impact of publicity during the trial was not measured but, as the 
foreman commented after the trial, most of his friends and clients had told 
his wife that the defendants had to be guilty, "They were very forceful in 
what they thought, I figure that 90 percent of them thought that they were 
guilty".60 The influence publicity may have had in this trial is a salutary 
warning for the vast majority of cases where jurors are not sequestered. To 
simply assume that a person called for jury service can or will abide by a 
judge's direction to ignore publicity previous to or during the trial, as the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal appear to, requires something of a leap of 
faith which a number of studies indicate is insupportable. 61 
In the Berrigan trial , however, even pre-trial publicity probably had little to do 
with Evans, the juror who most strongly hung out for conviction . He turned 
out to be something of a "wild card" who believed from the beginning of the 
trial that he was doing God's work in voting for conviction and who was 
thereafter unable to be engaged rationally. 62 How did this juror get rated as 
a "two" by the defence team? It appears Cooke P's fears are well founded 
in this instance. Evans apparently lied during the voir dire. He stated that, 
"More could be done and should be done to end the war ... " and then, 
asked about priests and nuns who opposed the war, he replied , "The 
church people should do more of that. "63 In SJS's defence, the survey 
information had indicated that as an older, male, store owner, Evans was 
unlikely to be supportive of the defence case. The selection team chose to 
ignore the demographics in this case and rely on his statements during voir 
dire. 
With, Schwartz, the second juror who voted for conviction , it was the other 
way around. Here the defence lawyers relied on promising demographics 
60 Above n 55, 83. 
61 This issue is extensively addressed in the Symposium issue on the Selection and 
Function of the Modern Jury, (Winter 1991) 40 Am UL Rev, see particularly NN Minow and 
FH Cate "Who is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media" 631 and NL Kerr, GP Kramer, 
JS Carroll and JJ Alfini "On Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial 
Pre-trial Publicity: An Empirical Study 665. 
62 Above n 55, 80. 
63 Above n 55, 43. 
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and did not engage in further questioning. Overall , however, it seems 
unlikely that this juror would have stood alone for conviction . Evans was 
obviously determined to convict and sought support from Schwartz on the 
basis of religious beliefs. Another of the jurors reports that he would 
verbally attack them and then say to Schwartz, "We'll stick together. We 
have to do God's work."64 In post-trial interviews seven of the jurors said 
they believed that had Evans changed his vote Schwartz would have 
followed suit. 65 
The evidence alone was not "underwhelming" or "ridiculous" enough for the 
judge to allow the defence motion for dismissal at the end of the 
prosecution case. The "evidence" was also enough to cause a third juror on 
top of the two already mentioned to vote for conviction on the conspiracy 
charges in the first vote. Interestingly, this juror too was ranked as a 2 for 
the defence. Like the other 'rational ' convict-prone juror she had favourable 
demographics and was not asked many questions during voir dire. 
This trial brought to legal and public attention the possibility of using social 
science methods to assist in the selection of jurors. Perhaps the three 
major components of SJS are the survey, the assessment of predictive 
characteristics and data analysis, the means by which the first two are 
analysed. The next section of this paper addresses these three 
components in more detail and then briefly introduces other components . 
B Components of SJS 
1 Surveys 
Surveys in the community were used in the original SJS trial66 and are still 
probably the key feature of SJS. A random sample survey is taken to 
provide the basic data for the development of juror profiles. This is usually 
carried out over the telephone in order to interview a large number of 
people at minimal cost. In community surveys members of the public who 
would be eligible to serve as jurors are asked three sets of questions. 
64 Above n 62, 80. 
65 Above n 55, 81 . 
66 Above n 55. 
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The first set asks for the respondent's background characteristics, or 
demographics, (e.g., age, sex, occupation, prior jury service, prior 
experience in matters relating to the case, etc.). This information will be 
obtained from prospective jurors during the voir dire. The second set of 
questions measures beliefs and attitudes that are likely to be associated 
with a favourable or unfavourable trial verdict. The third set directly 
attempts to assess which side the respondent would favour in the trial. A 
brief description of the case is read and the respondent is asked to vote as 
if on a jury. 
Surveying has a number of inherent problems which can lead to skewed 
results. These difficulties are applicable to SJS surveys.67 
Of particular importance in SJS surveys is the need for the sample to be 
representative of the population from which the jury venire is to be drawn.68 
The authors of Inside the Jury69 note that it may be desirable to oversample 
certain types of potential jurors, "for example, if the defendant is black, it 
may be desirable to oversample from the black population". 70 The reason 
for this is difficult to understand unless it is expected that the jurors will also 
be black. "Oversampling" may be appropriate if it is anticipated that the 
eventual jury will have a different demographic than the population from 
which the jury venire is drawn. The difference in demographics between 
population and jury arises through the means of exclusion noted in the 
diagram above. 71 
Surveys can provide a number of benefits in jury selection . Properly 
constructed, they will they take account of regional and case variability in 
attitudes. A community survey that provides specific and clear information 
67 See, for example, DG Myers Social Psychology (4th ed , McGraw Hill , New York, 1993) 
18-19, suggesting difficulties arise in the timing of the survey, using an unrepresentative 
sample, response options which induce a particular answer, influential order of questioning 
and the wording of the questions themselves. These factors may lead to misleading 
answers in any survey. 
68 J Berman & BOA Sales "A critical evaluation of the systematic approach to jury selection" 
(1977) 4 Crim Justice & Behaviour 219-240. The jury consultant's commitment to the 
population from which the jury was to be drawn was, in fact, an important requirement in the 
choice of consultant by the OJ Simpson defence team; see text at n 129. 
69 R Hastie, SD Penrod & N Pennington Inside the Jury (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1983). 
70 Above n 69, 124. 
71 Section 11 . 
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as to what certain groupings of jurors are likely to think about issues in the 
case will enable some assessment of critical attitudes and opinions without 
direct questioning in voir dire. This is particularly relevant to New Zealand 
where jury selection currently has to be achieved without voir dire. 
In cases where voir dire is available, a previously established correlation of 
background demographics and attitudes should alert counsel to possible 
deception if the correlation is not evident in a juror's answers during voir 
dire. This was the key SJS provided Schulman et al in the Berrigan trial 
which, had they turned it, may have allowed them to "release" the two pro-
conviction jurors. 
Survey information of a general nature can, by itself or with more specific 
information that may be known about jurors prior to the trial , establish the 
probabilities of the presence of favourable or unfavourable jurors in the jury 
pool. Knowledge of this will allow counsel to more effectively use 
peremptory challenges; ie., when a high number of unfavourable potential 
jurors is indicated peremptory challenges will need to be used particularly 
cautiously so as not to be exhausted before the final juror is selected. 
These benefits, however, are achieved within the framework of definite 
limits. The predictive power of surveys is limited to a probability estimate. 
They can never be 100 per cent accurate as to a potential juror's 
favourability. 72 Clearly, therefore, surveys alone are inadequate for 
effective SJS. 
Surveys are further limited by the expense is involved in conducting a 
survey which is extensive enough to provide useful results. Schulman et al 
noted in the Berrigan trial that there was a dilemma when asking people to 
respond to the survey with whether or not to tell them what it would be used 
for. In many cases, if the person is told the information will be used to 
assist one side of a case they may wish not to participate. This would 
provide a skewed sample of people who were either neutral or biased 
towards the side completing the survey. Schulman dealt with this difficulty 
by, in his words, 'uneasily' determining not to disclose the true purpose of 
72 Above n 71 , 7. 
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the survey. This difficulty may be reduced if the results are discoverable by 
the other side to use as they see fit. If both sides could use the survey then 
the cost could also be shared in some way. This 'sharing' may be hindered 
by the desire of each side to frame questions differently. However, as 
noted above, skewed question-framing will lead to skewed answers. The 
best, most useful information will be obtained through objective questioning. 
Each side may have to compromise somewhat but it is submitted that the 
benefits to cost of sharing will outweigh most, if not all, disadvantages. 
Although there is no record of the results from a pre-trial survey being 
shared, the questionnaire administered to jurors in the OJ Simpson trial was 
a conglomeration of questions put forward by both sides and approved by 
the judge. Both sides then obtained the results . 
2 Data ana/ysis73 
Data obtained from potential jurors is analysed using statistical procedures. 
It is this process that Schulman recognised was missing in the Berrigan trial. 
Since that initial trial various methods have been employed to statistically 
analyse a potential juror's tendency to favour or oppose one side in a case . 
The most common of these is multiple regression analysis. This is a 
mathematical technique used to combine all the different characteristics of 
a potential juror into a single, predictive scale.74 Additional factors, such as 
the potential dynamics of the jury75 can also be added into the calculation. 
The more factors that are included in the calculation the more accurate will 
be the prediction of the juror's verdict preference. 
For any single factor x affecting another factory, where the correlation 
between variables y and x, is linear, is given by the equation y = rx + z. In 
graphical form this is a line whose gradient is given by r. r is the amount of 
correlation between y and x. r = 1 would mean that a x would correlate 
perfectly with y, this means that if x is known then y can be accurately 
predicted from the equation above. r = O would mean there is no 
correlation, the results are completely random and therefore no prediction is 
73 For the sake of clarity the mathematical section is dealt with at this point. 
74 JJ Rachlinski "Scientific Jury Selection And The Equal Protection Rights of Venire 
Persons" (1993) 24 PLJ 1500, 1507. 
75 See text at n 122. 
possible. r = -1 indicates that there is an inverse correlation . A correlation 
is generally regarded as statistically significant at r = .1. 
The above explanation is for single variable regression. However the 
preference for conviction depends on multiple factors and can be 
represented as a mathematical variable, P canv· A multiple regression 
equation is used to find P conv· Two questions which need to be addressed 
are: 76 
(a) which characteristics are important; and 
(b) how should these be combined. 
The various factors (f1, f2, h , ... ) thought to determine P canv are studied 
individually and every effort is made to account for all pertinent factors. 77 
Mathematically, f1 , h, hare independent variables and P canv is the 
dependent variable. Coefficients78 a, b, c ... measure the factors ' probable 
contribution to p conv-
This gives the general equation : 
P canv = a.f1 + b.f2 + c.h + ... 
The values of a, b, c .. . cannot be precise. The strength of the actual 
relationship to P canv. is measured with a t-test. 79 A factor that is dichotomous 
(eg gender) is a dummy variable , having the value O or 1. The inability to 
account for all the factors that go to make up a juror's conviction preference 
is, of course, a limit of SJS. Multiple regression formulas do not ignore 
unexplained factors , they incorporate them in what is called a random 
disturbance term. That is, the equation will look like the one above but with 
an additional factor of "u" to stand for the unknown quantity. 
P canv = a.f1 + b.f2 + c.h + ... + u 
76 Above n 66. 
77 GA Moore, MK Braswell 'The Probative Value of Multiple Regression Analysis in Title VII 
Litigation" (1989) 27 AmBusLJ 254. 
78 In the equation a = be, b determines the nature of the relationship between a and c. 'b' is 
called the coefficient of c. 
79 Each constant has its own t value , the larger the better, assessing its significance (ie the 
probability that its effect is not due to chance. 
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The goal, of course, is to reduce the value of u to as small an amount as 
possible . 
For example a particular case a survey might indicate that age, income, 
education, and political liberalism are factors which impact to an estimated 
degree on a juror's verdict preference. 
The equation might look like: 
Pconv. = .008 x (age)+ .001 x (income in thousands) - .015 x (years 
of education - .03 x (liberalism score) .80 
According to this equation , a forty year old person earning $20,000 per year 
with sixteen years of education and a liberalism score of 3 would have a 
preference score of .12. Slotting the statistics of a similar but older person 
into the equation would produce a higher score (ie, the older person would 
be more likely to convict) ; while a person of the same age but better 
educated would have a lower score. The defence will look for the lowest 
Pconv. scores available amongst the potential jurors. 
Pconv. for a juror indicates a juror's preference in certain theoretical 
conditions. A perfect regression equation would predict Pconv. and the 
extent of any variation in its value. This would mean the equation contained 
all the information in order to predict the conviction preference for each juror 
without exception . In reality, jury regression models have typically 
accounted for only about a quarter of the variance81 Partly, this results from 
an inability to disentangle all the competing identities that constitute a 
person. The task is made even more complex by the necessity of 
accounting for additional "unknowable" factors such as the particular group 
dynamics which will operate. 
R2 (the coefficient of variation) is a measure of the calculated variation of 
Pconv. compared to actual vafiation of Pconv. If R' = 0 then the model 
80 Above n 69, 126. 
81 RA Berk, M Hennessy & J Swan "The vagaries and vulgarities of scientific jury selection: 
A methodological evaluation" (1977) 1 Evaluation Quarterly 143-158. However some report 
higher figures, e.g., see text at n 111 . 
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explains none of the variation. If R2 = 1 then the model explains precisely 
all of the variation. 
Possible misspecifications in a multiple regression equation are:82 
(a) omission of relevant variables; 
(b) inclusion of inappropriate variables; 
(c) inappropriate functional form; and 
(d) failure to apply standards to the goodness of fit (inaccuracies in 
evaluating a,b,c ... ). 
Alongside these limits of multiple regression are the problems generated 
when attempting to move from very specific sample results to a 
generalisation for actual jurors. These, of course, are drawbacks but one 
can see how it may have assisted Schulman et al to ensure divergent 
factors for each juror were taken into account during the ranking process. 83 
3 Characteristic and attitude assessment 
In order to apply the community survey to the trial at hand survey responses 
are analysed to determine which juror characteristics correlate with 
favourable attitudes and beliefs and then which attitudes and beliefs will go 
on to correlate with verdict preferences.84 
An attitude, in psychological terms, represents an internal mental state that 
indicates a propensity or predisposition to respond in one manner or 
another. 85 Hence, by definition, an attitude can indicate a verdict 
preference. For example, if a person has an attitude of approval towards 
the police this will cause them (predispose them) to respond favourably to 
82 Above n 77, 264-273. 
83 Multiple Regression is judicially accepted in United States courts, for instance to show 
that bias has existed in employment practice. See above n 77. 
84 s Siedman Diamond Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists Know and Do Not 
Know (1990) 73 Judicature 178, 179. 
85 PC Ellsworth "Some steps between attitudes and verdicts" in R Hastie (ed) Inside the 
Juror (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993) 49. 
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evidence presented by the police and so they will be more likely to convict 
than a person who was suspicious of the police. 
The SJS consultant may be able to utilise an attitude which has been 
proven to be predictive. However the few predictive attitudes that have 
been proven to date tend to be valid only in some cases. 
If the consultant cannot utilise any established predictive attitude they may 
organise an attitude scale. This is generally a series of questions which 
relate to a central , core attitude and makes use of the fact that attitudes are 
often "shortforms" for a group of related beliefs. For instance the extent to 
which a person agrees with the positive responses to the group of related 
questions reflects the extent to which a respondent endorses the core 
attitude tested for. 86 
A large number of people will then be presented with an abbreviated 
version of the case and their reactions to various issues in the case will be 
correlated to the new attitude scale so the consultant can determine that 
certain attitudes will indicate a particular verdict preference. The most direct 
transference of this scale to the potential jury is by a system recently 
introduced in some state courts which allows litigants to prepare a written 
series of questions which potential jurors can respond to in writing . The 
SJS consultant then determines which measurable attitudes will best predict 
verdicts and includes the attitude scale in the questionnaire. 87 In the OJ 
Simpson trial , 88 the questionnaire appears to have contributed to accurate 
attitude assessments and resulting predictions were effective. 
It is in the prediction of verdict preference from characteristics and attitudes 
that SJS meets its most formidable hurdle and ferocious critics. 
The critics have argued that in an overwhelming number of occasions an 
individual's verdict is accounted for by the weight of the evidence and not 
by any individual characteristic or attitude. The critics are not the only ones 
86 Above n 67, 112-116. 
87 Above n 69. 
88 See text at n 121 . 
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who believe this: a juror will form a pre-deliberation opinion he or she 
believes to be rigorously and rationally based on the evidence but: 89 
[O]ne of the most surprising experiences for jurors in many cases is to 
discover, at the start of deliberation, that other jurors could disagree with 
them on a verdict that seems patently obvious. 
This is a common occurrence ; in approximately 70 per cent of criminal trials 
the jury has a split verdict prior to deliberation.90 More seriously, in some 
cases the jury cannot agree at the end of deliberation after the jurors have 
had an extensive opportunity to highlight to each other the evidence they 
find convincing .91 Different jurors evidently draw different conclusions about 
the right verdict on the basis of the same evidence. The difference must 
stem from individual differences. 92 
Possible influential differences include beliefs and knowledge about how 
the world works93 or should work; enduring personality traits , preferences, 
and attitudes; mental capacities; past experience; and a variety of 
biological , social , and economic factors that are previously described as 
demographic background.94 
Hastie, Penrod and Pennington describe the failure to convincingly link 
verdict preference to any juror attribute:95 
The relationships between juror behaviour and juror attitudes, personality , 
and demographic characteristics are not well understood. More than 160 
jury studies provide little systematic evidence that personality variables, 
such as authoritarianism, locus of control , and legal attitudes, provide the 
predictive power needed to detect and challenge biased jurors, even 
assuming that requisite information on prospective jurors is available in voir 
dire. 
89 PC Ellsworth "Are twelve heads better than one?" (1989) 52 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 205-224. 
90 Richard O Lempert "Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and 
the Jury-Size Cases" (1975) 73 Mich L Rev 643, 649. 
91 In New Zealand it is of concern that this now occurs in 1 O per cent of trials. See J Goulter 
No Verdict New Zealand's Hung Jury Crisis (Random House Publishers, Auckland, 1997). 
92 SM Kassin, LS Wrightsman The American Jury on Trial Psychological Perspectives 
~Hemishere Publishing Corporation , New York, 1988) 45 . 
3 "The Just World Scale" is a well established assessment scale which measures a sense of 
imminent justice. People scoring high on this will anticipate that one invariably gets what 
one deserves, eg, "When parents punish their children it is almost always for good reasons." 
See above n 56, 234. 
94 Above n 69, 43. 
95 Above n 69, 127. 
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However they then go on to acknowledge that some characteristics are a 
fruitful source of information on juror bias in some cases. They note 
particularly attitude to the death penalty. Indeed, the fact that those jurors 
who oppose the death penalty are less likely to convict than jurors who do 
not is the most clearly established predictive tool that uses attitudes. 96 
From this, essentially cynical , standpoint Hastie et al used a mock jury to 
carry out an extensive study of the efficacy of SJS methods using a mock 
jury. 828 jurors provided a wide range of demographic information on their 
personal backgrounds in a post-deliberation questionnaire. 97 
This information was entered into a multiple regression formula . The pre-
deliberation verdict preference was used as the dependent variable.98 Four 
independent variables were found to be significant in predicting juror 
preference. Employment status showed the highest correlation of r = .110, 
gender was r = -.073, number of previous criminal cases as jurors was r = 
0.59 and number of previous cases (criminal or civil) as jurors (r = .054) .99 
At the inclusion of the fourth factor R2 was only 0.032. 
A more extensive questionnaire was administered to 269 jurors. From this 
questionnaire five factors were found to contribute significantly to 
predictions of verdict preference: residence in a wealthy suburb (r = -.20) , 
attitude toward punishing someone who causes another's death (r = -.16), 
marital status (r = -. 13) and newspaper read (r = -.08). R2 of these factors 
came to .1089 or 11 per cent of the variance in verdict preference. 100 
The researchers found that when all four possible verdicts were taken into 
account 45.6 percent of the jurors were correctly classified by verdict 
preference. When the division was only into two groups (guilty v not guilty) 
96 Above n 69, 48, noting that in the past 30 years every study into this correlation has found 
that jurors who did not oppose the death penalty were more likely to convict than jurors who 
opposed the death penalty. "In our [Ellsworth et al 's] view, the answer to the basic 
"prediction question" is firmly established; attitude toward the death penalty, a fairly stable 
individual difference, does predict jurors' verdicts in a wide range of criminal cases.". 
97 Information included income, race , number of previous cases heard as a juror and 
number of previous criminal cases heard as a juror. 
98 The verdict preference was categorised into four possible verdicts from first degree 
murder to self-defence. 
99 Above n 69, 128. 
100 Above n 69, 129. 
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61 percent of the jurors were correctly classified. They note that this is 
better than chance (by 11 per cent) "but is not an impressively powerful 
lever for use in courtroom selection procedures". 101 
It is interesting that in this case Hastie, et al , appear not to have used the 
characteristic they state is the most valid predictor; that of attitude toward 
capital punishment. It may be noted, however, that one of the difficulties 
with SJS is that even where a characteristic has been shown to have 
predictive value, the presiding judge may not allow the relevant question to 
be asked in order to determine whether a juror has that characteristic. 
Attitude to capital punishment, for example, may only be raised in a capital 
case.102 In New Zealand , with no recent experience of capital punishment 
and it currently not being a sentencing option this attitude to it may be 
entirely irrelevant. This difference is probably just the most obvious 
example of the difficulties in applying any American research into a New 
Zealand context. 
In the study Hastie et al did determine that the jurors' world knowledge 
concerning events and individuals involved in the facts of the case does 
affect their verdict decisions. They attribute this to various readings of the 
evidence by jurors; such as a varied knowledge from past experience of 
what would be typical behaviour in a pub fight. Demographic characteristics 
may in this way inform on likely attitudes. 103 
Ten years after Hastie, Penrod and Pennington's study a group of studies 
was carried out which does affirm the predictive value of attitudes.104 
Moran, Cutler and De Lisa note that jury selection research has not 
sufficiently addressed the controversy over the effectiveness of SJS: 105 
101 Above n 84. 
102 Above n 56. 
If active research and public communication of empirical results are 
hallmarks of science, then investigation of the new method of jury selection 
is at an impasse. While consultants expect to be right 19 out of 20 times, 
academic reviewers assert that "a large body of empirical research 106 calls 
into question the premise that jurors' votes during deliberation can be 
103 The phenomenon of varied "readings" of the evidence is discussed in the text at n 136. 
104 Above n 56. (This article deals with the efficacy of SJS part of their studies) . 
105 Above n 56, 312, quoting R MacCoun "Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making" 
~1989) 244 Sci 1046. 
06 Including, notably the study by Hastie et al , above n 69. 
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reliably predicted from juror characteristics that are observable before the 
trial. In general, jurors demographic attributes, personality traits, and 
general attitudes are associated weakly and unreliably with jurors verdicts" . 
In this group of studies Moran et al sought to establish, among other things, 
whether attitudes toward tort reform 107 was significantly associated with 
respondents ' perceptions of criminal defendant culpability. 
Each of the studies used a combination of jury selection survey 
methodology, multiple regression analysis and attitude assessment. 
Respondents were all eligible for jury service, were given part of a brief 
actual case scenario which occurred in the state in which they lived, then 
gave a judgment on the likelihood of the defendant's culpability. After this 
they answered questions designed to assess their attitudes toward tort 
reform . Each of the three criminal studies increased in sophistication and 
indicated that respondents who favoured tort reform perceived the 
defendant as more culpable than did respondents who were less in favour 
of tort reform . In their conclusion the authors of this study state that the 
average correlation between attitudes toward tort reform and verdict 
inclination was r = .20 and that this would therefore increase predictive 
accuracy from 50% (ie. chance) to 60%.108 
Moran, Cutler and De Lisa conclude109 that the academic critics of SJS110 
have failed to address either studies with real jurors or relevant measures 
which do have predictive power. In particular Moran et al suggest that jury 
simulations which have not found SJS useful have failed to measure 
attitudes toward specific issues relevant to the case at hand. In contrast, 
the authors note that their juror surveys during the previous five years, with 
measures of specific case-relevant attitudes, had invariably correlated with 
juror verdict inclination. In a drug-related study Moran et al measured these 
107 This was related particularly to Florida 's proposed Amendment 10 (1993) which was 
designed to put a cap on lawyers' fees and limit awards for pain and suffering; ie 
disapproving of lawyers' excesses, including those they obtain for their clients. 
108 Above n 56, 327. 
109 Above n 56, 326. 
110 Notably SS Diamond, R Hastie and R MacCoun. 
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predictors explaining as much as 30% of the variance in verdict when the 
evidence was not overwhelming.111 
4 Focus groups 
A group of mock-jurors is drawn from the area where the trial will be held 
and is presented by attorneys with one or two issues in the trial or perhaps 
an opening statement. The group is then broken into sub groups where 
they discuss their responses and then present them back to the attorneys 
and consultants. Then individual members are questioned in detail about 
what they disliked and liked, believed or didn't, understood or not. Their 
responses are assimilated and identified with corresponding demographic 
types and attitudes. Robert Hanley, former Chairman of the Section of 
Litigation of the American Bar Association , describes how focus groups help 
him in his central objective of getting to know the potential jurors: 112 
With the information mock jurors provide, we find out what types of 
personalities and personal biases are most dangerous to our case .... These 
groups help us to isolate those prospective jurors whose personalities and 
biases will probably cause them to respond negatively to me, my cl ient, my 
client's witnesses, and our side of the case at trial. 
Focus groups are a more expensive method than telephone surveys so a 
smaller, less representative, group has to be studied. The advantage, 
however, is that it gives the respondents a more realistic understanding of 
the nature of the case and so can provide more accurate responses.113 In 
the OJ Simpson trial both the prosecution and the defence used focus 
groups to obtain information that proved to be reliable.11 4 
111 Above n 108. other studies which Moran et al refer to as showing attitudes to be 
significant predictors of verdict are: G Moran et al "Jury Selection in Major Controlled 
Substance Trials: The Need for Extended Voir Dire" (1990) 3 Forensic Rep 331 , showing 
attitudes toward lawyers and drugs are predictive in a criminal case against a lawyer 
charged with drug crimes and attitudes towards drugs are predictive when the charge is 
large-scale drug trafficking ; J Goodman et al "Matters of Money: Voir Dire in Civil Cases" 
(1990) 3 Forensic Rep 303, showing attitudes toward battered women are predictive in 
murder trials where the defendant alleges they are a battered women. 
112 RF Hanley "Getting to Know You" (1991) 40 AULR 865, 871 . 
113 Above n 84. 
114 See text at n 131 . 
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5 Juror investigations 
The two most common types of juror investigations are community network 
models and home surveillance of potential jurors.11 5 The former is another 
form of the community survey and involves combining general 
neighbourhood demographic information and aggregate interview 
responses. The latter is a rather more insidious approach of researching 
potential jurors by interviewing their neighbours, watching their homes, and 
generally investigating them. As noted above 116 , the home (or hairdresser!) 
investigation is the main method New Zealand counsel use apart from 
traditional stereotyping. 
6 In-court assessment of juror non-verbal communication 
Communication experts generally agree that over 50% of the meaning of a 
communicated message is transferred through the nonverbal behaviour 
accompanying the oral message.117 . While a person may control the actual 
words and phrases that come out of their mouths, it is very difficult to 
control the entire communication. The speaker is less aware of his or her 
kinesic118 or paralinguistic119 communication and therefore these are the 
areas where 'leakage' of any intended deception is likely to occur.120 
If juror non-verbal communication can be read accurately it will be 
particularly useful in detecting a potential juror who is attempting to hide his 
or her prejudices in order to make them felt in the jury room. This method 
goes some way to answering Cooke P's doubts in Sanders as to detection. 
However this method does require the opportunity to talk with the juror, 
preferably at some length. The current "analysis" undertaken in New 
Zealand during the walk to the jury box is clearly inadequate. As one 
prosecution counsel in the Justice Department study recognised: 121 
115.Above n 2, Barber 1237. 
116 See text at n 47. 
117 EJ lmwinkelried "Demeanour Impeachment: Law and Tactics" (1985) 9 Am . J. Trial 
Advoc. 183, 187 cited in J Goodwin Symposium: Securities Litigation: The Fundamental 
Issues: Note: Articulating the Inarticulable" (1996) 38 Ariz L Rev 739 at n 3. 
118 Body language, such as facial expressions, body movements, body orientation , eye 
contact, and hand movements. See Goodwin , above n 117, at n 137. 
119 Breathing, pauses, pitch and tone of voice , and speech disturbances unrelated to the 
content of the message. Above n 118. 
120 Gerald R. Miller & James B. Stiff, Deceptive Communication 20 (1993) cited in above n 
117, 752. 
121 Above n 39, 128. 
36 
... you 've got that few seconds to make that assessment, that's quite 
arbitrary really , the assessment you get from that. . 
7 Group dynamics analysis 
Group dynamic analysis assesses the way in which the jury will work 
together as a group. The identification of jurors who are likely to be 
influential is particularly important as their views will play more than a 1/12 
role in the jury decision making. Hastie et al 122 found that jurors who speak 
more also tend to be more persuasive. These jurors include those who 
have a high status occupation or some expertise related to the case, highly 
educated, retentive memories, male (men have spoken 50% more than 
women since studies began) , neither young nor old and particularly the jury 
foreperson . Typically four jurors will consume more than half the talking 
time. The foreperson will speak twice the amount of anyone else and a 
foreperson committed to a particular view can often make the difference in 
the outcome of a jury's deliberations.123 These findings confirm 
considerations that the SJS team cautiously took into account in selecting 
the Berrigan jury. And , comfortingly for Schulman et al in their experience 
with their "wild-card" juror, Hastie et al conclude that although a number of 
factors point to influential jurors, it is difficult to predict who will be a hold out 
juror.124 
Another factor to be considered in the group dynamics analysis is the 
possibility of subgroups forming who will strengthen one side of a case. In 
the original the SJS trial 125 the consultant opted to include a group of young 
women whom he posited would function as a subgroup supporting the 
defence.126 
122 Above n 69, 129. 
123 Above n 67, 59. 
124 Above n 69, 166. 
125 Above n 55. 
126 Above n 2, Barber, 1237. 
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8 Mock trial 
After counsel present evidence and submissions the 'jurors' deliberate and 
the counsel analyse their discussion. This technique provides information 
for selection and also, perhaps more significantly, assists counsel formulate 
their trial strategy during the course of the trial. Although exceedingly 
expensive the use of mock juries has been found to work.127 
C The Extreme Example? - The OJ Simpson Trial 
1 SJS effected 
SJS originated with the unusual, high publicity, Berrigan trial and has 
recently been brought to public attention in another unusual, high publicity 
trial. It is difficult to deny the advantages obtained from SJS in The People 
of the State of California v Orenthal James Simpson 128 . It is submitted that 
although the uniqueness of this trial in terms of its participants, publicity, 
length and expenditure must be taken into account when drawing any 
conclusions, these are factors to be considered, not factors which outweigh, 
the benefits of SJS over traditional methods of jury selection . 
The defence were highly positive in their approach to SJS. Only two 
months after the murders of Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman the defence 
team unanimously agreed on hiring Jo-Ellan Dimitrius of Forensic 
Technologies Inc.. Dimitri us, like Schulman, began with surveys in the area 
where the trial would be held. She used four surveys of Los Angeles 
Country residents to gauge community attitudes toward Simpson and the 
prosecution, as well as potential defence arguments . Like Schulman, too , 
Dimitri us then selected and addressed two focus groups of mock jurors -
selected to resemble the likely Simpson jury. Dimitrius also prepared the 
defence's proposed jury questionnaire and tabulated the responses to the 
questionnaire administered by Judge Ito. 
The prosecution, headed by Marcia Clark, were far more ambivalent in their 
attitude toward, and use of, SJS. Clark reluctantly agreed to consider a pro-
bono offer by a prominent jury consultant to assist in jury selection . Donald 
Vinson, of DecisionQuest recruited a diverse group of thirty "jurors" in the 
127 Above n 126. 
128 Official Transcript, People v Simpson , No BA 097211 1995 WL 686428 (Cal Super Ct LA 
County 1995). 
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area He conducted a second research exercise in Phoenix Arizona, where 
he said he could find demographically comparable jurors. As a result of 
concern about publicity and the prosecution case being leaked by study 
jurors Clark would only agree to jurors being asked what they thought of the 
case so far, rather than be given mock presentations. 
However, even this limited research provided the prosecution with the 
majority of the information they needed to avoid a defence-biased jury. A 
telephone survey in the Los Angeles district revealed that black men were 
three times as likely as black women to believe that Simpson was guilty; 
black women felt overwhelmingly that, even if Simpson had engaged in a 
pattern of violence against Nicole Brown Simpson, doing so didn't make him 
more likely to have killed her; and an alarmingly large number of black 
women felt that the use of physical force was not inappropriate in a 
marriage.129 
When the study jurors were asked to rate on a scale of one to ten how 
much sympathy they felt for each participant the results confirmed the 
telephone survey. Black women gave O.J. Simpson all nines and tens. 
The murder victim, Nicole Brown Simpson, scored sevens, fives and threes. 
Black jurors' reactions to Clark were scathing, particularly those of black 
women who described her as , "Shifty", "Strident", and , most commonly, 
"Bitch". The racial divisions proved almost absolute, with black women 
backing the defendant most intensely.130 
These findings appeared to contradict the experience Marcia Clark had 
gained in a successful career. This experience had "taught" her that a 
particular style and a particular juror would produce the result she sought: 131 
Many of Clark's trial 's took place "downtown" - in the Criminal Courts 
Building in Los Angeles, that is - and she felt a great affinity for the jurors ... 
who were selected there .... She even had a fan club of sorts consisting of a 
group of former jurors, all black women , who wrote letters to her and 
otherwise kept in touch with her after their trials ended. 
129 J Toobin "Annals of Law The Marcia Clark Verdict" The New Yorker 9 September 1996 
58, 64 . 
130 Above n 129. 
131 Above n 129, 58. 
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Young black women were traditionally favourable to Clark: young black 
women were favourable to O.J . A careful path would have to be trod to 
accommodate both these facts. Clark did not find that path . She chose to 
rely on the lesson she had learned from her experience rather than the SJS 
advice and tolerated Vinson's input only until the second day of jury 
selection 132 when she informed him he was no longer required. 
The defence, however, continued their close association with Dimitrius. 
She briefed the lawyers before their voir dire questioning and closely 
observed the body language and reactions of prospective jurors as they 
were questioned. At key points throughout the trial, she was in court to 
assess juror reactions to the evidence and the witnesses. Aside from the 
revealed black female bias Dimitrius chose just eight questions from the 
Court-administered 85-page questionnaire that she believed strongly 
predicted a juror's vote. These included questions about Simpson's guilt or 
innocence and what constituted a reasonable doubt. 
Some of Dimitrius' advice clearly played a part in the eventual verdict. For 
instance several jurors pointed to their understanding of reasonable doubt 
in causing them to vote for acquittal. These jurors commented that they 
were uncertain about the verdict going into deliberation and some have 
stated that they believed Simpson was involved in the murders in some 
unspecified manner, but that they harboured enough reasonable doubts to 
acquit. 133 Juror's post-trial remarks apparently provide little information 
about how they conceived of reasonable doubt but Hastie notes that there 
were hints that for some jurors reasonable doubt took the form of the 
incompleteness and vagueness of major components of the prosecution 
story, that is, the existence of some doubts. rather than a definite alternate 
explanation of the credible evidence. Fore ample. as one juror noted: 134 
It is important to remember that a r t 
that can create a reasonable d u t 
were many questions that ,.,.er I t a, " 
132 Jury selection lasted six weeks, a I ngth t t , 
instance, Hastie and N Pennington ·p r ~t 
The OJ Simpson Stories: Behavioural ~ 1 t --t,· 
California v Orenthal James Simp ~ 11· 
133 Above n 132. 
134 Above n 132. 
e 1 .t requ res just one thing 
re than that. There 
rticism. See, for 
ury's View: 
1e of the State of 
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2 Affects explained 
The opportunity for the defence to create that doubt in the minds of jurors in 
this case is explained by social science. It was also discoverable by social 
science before the trial. Hastie et al explain it in terms of the story model 
which psychologists use to describe the process through which a juror 
arrives at a verdict. 135 The story is constructed both from information 
presented at trial and from the juror's background knowledge . Each juror 
determines guilt or innocence by constructing one or more narrative 
sequences; the most convincing of which will point them to their verdict. 
Evidence from research by cognitive and social psychologists has 
established that as a general principle ambiguous or incomplete information 
will tend to be interpreted in a fashion that is consistent with a person's 
initial attitudes and that confirms their expectations. This principle is 
particular relevant in jury situations where: 136 
[J]urors are faced with a complex task with a host of new, often conflicting 
information , both legal and factual and in unfamiliar language, to be 
grasped and resolved . This situation provides fertile ground for an 
unperceived operation of and reliance on pre-existing attitudes. 
Hastie et al believe that a juror's race (via associated pre-existing attitudes) 
made a difference in the construction and acceptance of the story that 
seems to have been most important in undermining the prosecution story 
that OJ Simpson murdered Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman 
and thereby creating a "reasonable doubt" in the minds of jurors. That story 
is one where Fuhrman, a police officer (possibly aided by other police 
officers) planted incriminating evidence. The plausibility of this story needs 
to be supported by jurors' inferences as to the likelihood of its occurrence. 
Hastie et al note that African Americans , compared with white Americans, 
hold more beliefs and have more experiences that support the plausibility of 
stories of police misconduct and police bigotry. This was confirmed by post-
trial interviews where jurors told stories of police errors and misconduct, for 
example the false arrest of members of their own families . In fact jurors' 
reports on the deliberation process indicate that, at most, only one of the 
two initial guilty votes was cast by one of the eight black jurors. 
135 Above n 132, 960. 
136 Above n 85, 51 . 
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Jurors' comments after the trial clearly reflect the comments the prosecution 
obtained from pre-trial jury research. The following explanation of how one 
juror perceived the marital violence-related evidence reflects the comments 
of a number of other jurors: 137 
Now, if you put all of those together, they were always drunk. Both of them, 
all of them . ... drinking , tempers are flaring ... So, when they went from "89 
to "92 or "93 when he came through the door - you know, the 911 tape -
there was no abuse there . He hadn't hit her or anything, but he did scare 
her. But there was no abuse there . What they presented to me, well, I 
related it all to they had been drinking .... But I didn 't think it was necessarily 
a motive for murder. 
Uelman, a law professor assisting the defence team, notes that predicting 
human behaviour will never be an exact science and so ultimately, both 
sides were still guessing, right up to the return of the verdict. However the 
lesson he suggests to be taken from the jury selection process in People v 
0 J Simpson is that diversity on juries does make a difference, and many of 
the decisions and strategies employed by the lawyers can drastically affect 
that diversity.138 
Of course others draw very different lessons from the People v OJ Simpson 
case. Hastie et al suggest that jury selection procedures, especially the voir 
dire examinations preceding the exercise of the peremptory challenges, 
played an unreasonably exaggerated role in the Simpson trial. They also 
state that: 139 
The voir dire process seems to have been wholly ineffective at producing a 
balanced and impartial panel. The panel still included some reasonably 
biased jurors - prejudiced jurors who had not been identified in the over-long 
voir dire. By the reports of members of the final jury panel , at least one 
extremely racist juror remained among the two final alternates. 
However, they also admit that, "the Simpson trial may be an example of a 
case in which jury selection did help cause the verdict"140 and object to SJS 
for allowing the side with the most resources to obtain an advantage. 
137 Above n 132, 972. 
138 GF Uelman Lessons from the Trial (Andrews and McMeel , Kansas City, 1996) 91 . 
139 Above n 132, 97 4. 
140 Above n 139. 
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There is a further apparent contradiction in their statement of scepticism of 
the efficacy of SJS methods in more typical trials alongside their statement 
that: 141 
Assuming our speculation about the race difference in prior beliefs is true, 
there simply exists a race difference that would be related to jurors' verdicts 
in any case with the Simpson trial elements: that is, an African American 
suspect, mostly white police officers, and a defence argument that racist 
officers framed the suspect. 
It is possible that the story model explanation offers scope for input by SJS 
in numerous, if not all , trials. Any trial to which the jurors must apply their 
"common sense" or life experiences to fill gaps in the prosecution story will 
admit more than one "reading". These different "readings" by jurors are 
viewed as a positive ingredient in trials and is one of the reasons why we 
have a number of jurors, so that the various readings can be debated until 
common verdict can be arrived at. The goal of SJS is to determine the 
likely "readings" of the potential jurors. 
IV SUMMARY 
A Critics 
Currently the best advertising for the efficacy of SJS is the cases where it 
has been used successfully. The Berrigan brothers trial and the OJ 
Simpson trial are examples. But, as the critics are quick to point out, it is 
not possible to say that it was SJS that actually made the difference. 
Diamond describes what would be required to provide such evidence that in 
any trial SJS could determine a verdict: 142 
In the ideal test of SJS, a series of cases would be tried before multiple 
juries, some 'scientifically ' selected and others traditionally chosen . A 
comparison of the verdicts rendered by the two types of juries would test the 
value of the method . This direct test has not yet been done. 
Even if the resources and will were found to conduct this test it would still be 
inherently flawed in that it could only ever be carried out in a hypothetical 
court situation . Missing would be the real defendant with the real 
consequences that stem for him or her from the jury's decision making 
process. Missing too, is the ability to distinguish how much affect is 
produced by the particular group dynamics of any given set of jurors, real or 
141 Above n 139. 
142 Above n 84. 
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simulated. It is impossible to conduct the series of cases before multiple 
juries before in a true-life court situation and it is equally impossible to test 
exactly what difference that variable would produce. 
Some SJS critics complain that even if a variable is found to be a useful 
predictor, it cannot generally be applied across a variety of cases.143 This is 
certainly a practical problem in terms of the need to conduct surveys and 
attitude assessments over a number of cases rather than just pulling some 
research out of a drawer and applying it to the case in hand. However, the 
fact that predictive variables differ for appreciably different scenarios is 
reassuring in that the process is responding to, and results reflecting , the 
obvious complexity of a trial situation . Scientific knowledge is appropriately 
uncertain because the world that it reflects is uncertain. 
As well as a huge number of possible variables, the "certainty" provided by 
SJS is further reduced by the limits the court imposes as to questioning. 
Diamond suggests, perhaps overstating the case somewhat: 144 
Assuming that more powerful attitudinal measures are available or can be 
developed, the measures will be valuable for jury selection only if they can 
be administered in court. 
This in turn raises difficulties for SJS. Courts tend to only permit voir dire 
questions that appear logically relevant to the case, eg juror support for the 
death penalty is consistently associated with a greater willingness to 
convict, and is likely to be the strongest predictor currently available can 
only be asked in capital cases. Judges are also unlikely to permit the 
number of questions required to provide an accurate measure. In addition , 
jurors are exposed to the responses of other jurors to the same questions 
and their answers may be affected by those earlier responses. 
Hastie et al state that the relationship between attitudes and behaviour has 
failed to produce consistent or striking relationships . They note that "if half 
of all jurors are expected to vote for conviction , simple guessing or coin-
143 Above n 84. 
144 Above n 84. 
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flipping would yield a 50 percent accuracy rate. And if 80 percent of the 
jurors prefer conviction, either in a single case or across cases, an 80 
percent accuracy rate can be achieved by always predicting conviction." 
These statements may make sense mathematically but counsel cannot 
simply predict conviction for an 80% success rate (one study indicates that 
the actual rate for jurors who prefer conviction is more in the region of 65%). 
Counsel must also predict the juror who will prefer acquittal. Each member 
of the jury is necessary to achieve a unanimous verdict. And then the 
"chance" wrong juror or jurors may be far more influential in the jury room 
than their 1/12 vote would suggest. 
Probably one of the most convincing arguments against the efficacy of SJS 
is that the predictions it produces are probabilistic not absolute. The 
analogy has been drawn to batting averages in baseball. Selecting a right-
handed batter to face a left-handed pitcher increases the chances of a hit, 
but by no means guarantees that outcome. Likewise, using survey data 
and observations might increase the probability of identifying a sympathetic 
juror, but does not guarantee that outcome. 145 
The extent to which empirical research on juror decision making is 
applicable to actual trials is a topic of great interest and controversy among 
social scientists. 146 The bulk of the experimental work uses "jury simulation" 
techniques in which participants are asked to play the role of jurors and 
make individual decisions about a hypothetical defendant on trial. This 
research has been criticised on several grounds as not adequately 
reflecting actual trials . 
Firstly, much of the research uses college student subjects who are not 
attitudinally or demographically representative of the juror population. 
Studies have shown that younger adults may have more weak and 
changeable attitudes than older adults, and therefore might be more 
susceptible to attorney persuasion tactics. 
145 JM Weyant Applied Social Psychology (Oxford University Press, New York, 1986). 
146 The following discussion is drawn from a comprehensive discussion of SJS techniques in 
JA Tanford and S Tanford "Better Trials Through Science: A Defence of Psychologist-
Lawyer Collaboration" (April , 1988) 66 NCL Rev 7 41 , 754. 
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Secondly, the stimulus materials often do not approximate an actual trial. 
Psychologists have used everything from short written case summaries to 
videotaped trial re-enactments , but these experimental types all share a 
common characteristic: they are shorter and simpler than actual trials . The 
effect of a nonevidentiary manipulation is likely to be larger in magnitude 
when subjects have less evidence to consider. 
Thirdly, decisions of experimental jurors usually have no real consequences 
for a defendant on trial. Manipulations of defendant and victim status 
characteristics had different effects when subjects thought there were 
consequences than when they thought there were none. 
Fourthly, only a handful of the many experiments have included group 
deliberations in their procedures; most studies ask for individual, written 
decisions. Some research suggests that the effects of extra-legal or 
nonevidentiary biases may be eliminated during deliberation, although the 
effects of certain evidentiary biases may be exacerbated. In either case, 
the effect of a manipulation on actual jurors cannot be predicted without 
considering the deliberation process. 
Fifthly, many of the studies assess impact not in terms of what verdict a 
person would reach, but along other lines such as how subjects perceive a 
witness's credibility . 
In response to these criticisms, researchers recently have attempted to 
increase the realism of their experiments through the use of non-student 
subjects, more realistic materials and procedures, and field experimental 
techniques. 147 However, most of the research summarised in the trial 
advocacy materials available to lawyers was conducted in the old way -- in 
laboratory settings quite different from the courtroom. Findings from such 
research would be considered low in generalisability. The work on attitudes 
and persuasion , nonverbal communication , and impression formation that 
forms the basis of many suggestions concerning attorney tactics is 
147 Above n 14, 755. 
particularly lacking in this respect. Most of the research did not even 
involve a simulated jury decision task.148 
Most experiments examining the influence of extra-legal factors hold 
evidentiary 
strength constant while manipulating variables of interest. In addition, an 
attempt often is made to keep the evidence weak or ambiguous in 
experiments to assure maximum sensitivity to the manipulation's effect. 
Studies that have manipulated evidentiary strength demonstrate that extra-
legal factors exert their greatest impact when the remaining trial evidence is 
weak or ambiguous, and may have little or no effect when evidence is 
strong. 149 In addition , the relative impact of extra-legal factors may be small 
compared to the impact of evidentiary factors. 1
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B Proponents 
It is accepted that SJS is probabilistic but SJS proponents would argue 
that: 1s1 
[W]hile certain errors and harm may be inherent even in the proper use of 
probabilistic tools, even more harm may be inherent in not using them . 
One advantage of "scientific" jury selection is a level of objectivity it provides 
between selector and juror. Although it is important for counsel to have a 
rapport with the jury members in order for them to hear what is said , it is 
also important to differentiate between jurors for whom counsel has positive 
feeling and jurors who, because of their attitudes or experiences, would be 
advantageous for the case.152 
An interesting feature of the literature on the efficacy of SJS, is that it is not 
so much the results that differ, but rather the interpretation of those results . 
All of the studies seem to find at least a 5% variability for at least some 
characteristics. 
148 Above n 147. 
149 Above n 147. 
150 Above n 146, 756. 
151 Saks & Kidd "Human Information Processing and Adjudication : Trial by Heuristics" 
~1980-81) 15 Law & Soc'y Rev 123, 125. 
52 JT Frederick The Psychology of the American Jury (http://www.usc.edu/dept/law-
lib/Michie, retrieved 2 August 1997) § 3-203.at n 3. 
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Professors Fulero & Penrod,153 determined that where scientific jury 
selection could account for 5% of the variance in verdict by attitudinal and 
personality measures, successful use of the information could potentially 
increase an attorney's performance from mere chance at 50% to 61 % 
correct classifications of juror preference. They similarly suggest that 15% 
of a variance accounted for could lead to 69% correctly classified juror 
preference. Further, they suggest that the variance achieved by Saks 
154
, 
which falls into the 5%-15% range, is small but that the potential 
improvement in selection performance is "not insignificant". 155 Diamond, 
however, concluded that the same figures were "modest at best"156 and that 
"there is good reason to be sceptical about the potential of [scientific jury 
selection] to improve selection decisions substantially."157 
Both Fulero & Penrod158 and Diamond note that early empirical , survey 
methods of SJS combined with newer jury preparation techniques (such as 
focus groups) may considerably increase the amount of variability in juror 
verdicts accounted for by the trial consultant's intervention. However, as 
Stolle et al point out, no empirical evaluations of the combined use of such 
techniques currently exists in the academic literature.159 These last authors 
suggest that critics of the effectiveness of SJS have "thrown the baby out 
with the bathwater'' based on early reviews of a small and methodologically 
unsophisticated body of literature."160 
SJS is assessed here in terms purely of jury selection . There are also a 
number of side benefits which accrue. Surveys can assess the 
community's reactions to various aspects of the case. Such information, if 
gathered early enough, can be helpful in evidence preparation and in the 
formation of arguments for use at trial. In addition, themes for the case can 
153 SM Fulero & SD Penrod "Attorney Jury Selection Folklore: What Do They Think and 
How Can Psychologists Help?" (1990) 3 Forensic Rep 233. 
154 See Saks Jury Verdicts: The Role of Group Size and Social Decision Rule (Lexington, 
MA: Lexington , 1977). 
155 Cited in DP Stolle, J K Robbennolt, R L Wiener "The Perceived Fairness of the 
Psychologist Trial Consultant: An Empirical Investigation" (1996) 20 Law & Psycho! Rev 
139, 145. 
156 Above n 84, 183. 
157 Above n 84, 180. 
158 Above n 155. 
159 Above n 155. 
160 Above n 155 at n 39. 
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be developed by noting the community's values and opinions and 
1ncorporat1ng them into the case strategy.1u 1 
Although strength of evidence 1s often cited as being the determin nt in 
producing a verdict, the SJS cnt1cs agree that SJS will have an impact 1n 
cases where the evidence 1s ambiguous iu. 
The ident1ficat1on of biased jurors is particularly important 1n cases wh r 
the ev1d nee is ambiguous or 111 th · oth r typ s of cas s which SJS critics 
cone de SJS seoms to h ve succeed d 1n and m y b pplicable for, 
highly controversial trials Som r s arch r su g st lh l ,n th tnal 
extra I gal bias (bias which 1nflu nc s lh Juror's d c, ,on nd I not part of 
th ev1d nee pros nt d ,n op n court) m y ,nflu nc th r ult ,n a n, ny 
as half th cas s 1 .1 
Surveys have con 1st ntly r v al d a numb r of urpr1s1ng b1a 
would b likely lo aff cl Juror' d c, ,on making 111 t p rt,cul r c 
which have not boon pp r nl to couns I or l11 1 arch 
which 
nd 
th 
survey w s und rtak n In oth r words th surv y ,nf orm lion g v 
mat nal contrad,ctory to th tr d1t1onal m thod of "common 
t r otyping Both th 8 rrigan lnal and th OJ S11npson ,nvolv d t I - st 
one xample wher "common s ns " could not b trust d nd SJS 
rev I d th true t to of ffa1r , , , coll g due l d p opl living in 
I larnsburg w re con rv t,v and bla k worn n would 1d ntif y with OJ 
Simpson and dot st M rcl . Cl rk 104 
Clark' f a,lur ,n r lying sol ly on hor xp n nc 1s som wt1 t sirnil r lo 
Schulman' failure 1n b 1ng way d by th "rogu "1uror' ttitud nd not 
h1 unf vourabl d mogr ph1c oth w r unabl lo d al with conf11ct1ng 
,nr orm lion, both took gu ss rind both w r wrong JS could hov 
ddr ss d both 1tuat1ons In Sct1ulmcln's al naly , rn thods 
h v 1rnprovod o s lo b abl to addr ss conf lict111g r suit In Cl rk' 
en , , tud, s of JS h v shown th 1nab11ity of cas w1d ppllc, t1ons, 1 
111 1 /\l>ovo ll 1' ;, 
111
•
1
" 01 , lor n ,111>ov ll14S 
1111 I tllll'> & Vr<Jrn111 111)(1 /01•,t I & l)i11,no1HI, I llo I Ill cl ol 11( , ( rnptor y Ct, 11lt•11 1< ., Oil J111 y 111d 
V(•1<11ct /\11 I xp •rirn Ill 111 (I I ( <IOI al I j•,lr ICI Co11rt ( I 9 /8) 30 11111 I H< V 401, b?S 30 
11
'
4 o IOXI Ill lll)OV< 11 SS illHI 11 131 
49 
a predictive characteristic in one case will not necessarily be predictive in 
another. SJS critics use this as one of its drawbacks however it is, as Clark 
discovered, a simple reality and most cases need to be considered in their 
own terms. As seen in OJ 's case , this truth is far more problematic for 
traditional stereotypical jury selection than it is for SJS. 
The Berrigan trial began SJS: the OJ Simpson case took it to an extreme. 
The ethics of SJS were generally accepted in the Berrigan trial ; the efficacy 
was not: the efficacy of SJS in the OJ trial is grudgingly conceded (at least 
to some extent) ; the ethics are decried. Defence counsel in the OJ trial 
suggests that keeping what progress we have made from being used in the 
courtroom is imprudent. He recommends that: 165 
A lot more can be done for defendants who cannot afford a jury consultant. 
Jury questionnaires should be standardised, and the information they gather 
should be readily available to both sides in every jury trial. Those we train 
as trial lawyers should be familiar with the tools of modern psychology, 
rather than with the racial stereotypes of old wives' tales. If we impose a 
regimen of ignorance upon the jury selection process, as many advocate by 
restricting lawyer participation in voir dire, we end up with greater deference 
to prejudices and stereotypes. 
V CONCLUSION 
This paper has reviewed an imperfect but preferable alternative to New 
Zealand's current stereotype-based method of jury selection. Scientific Jury 
Selection is informed by social science's understanding and research into 
human behaviour and is a more rational and fair approach to ensuring an 
accused receives his or her legislative right to an impartial jury. 
Social psychological research has identified ways in which prejudices, either 
inherent or induced through such influences as publicity, have a negative 
impact upon jury decisions. The research also works towards 
understanding how these prejudices can be reduced to a minimum in jury 
trial settings. It is this writer's opinion that the evidence and examples 
presented here demonstrate that although SJS has limits, it fans the flame 
that shows that freedom lives more convincingly than does traditional jury 
selection. The critics noted above suggest that any improvement achieved 
by SJS is only minimal: even if those critics are right, that improvement can 
165 Above n 138, 90. 
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A lot more can be done for defendants who cannot afford a jury consultant. 
Jury questionnaires should be standardised , and the information they gather 
should be readily available to both sides in every jury trial. Those we train 
as trial lawyers should be familiar with the tools of modern psychology, 
rather than with the racial stereotypes of old wives' tales. If we impose a 
regimen of ignorance upon the jury selection process, as many advocate by 
restricting lawyer participation in voir dire, we end up with greater deference 
to prejudices and stereotypes. 
V CONCLUSION 
This paper has reviewed a valid , if imperfect, alternative to New Zealand's 
current stereotype-based method of jury selection. Scientific Jury Selection 
is informed by social science's understanding and research into human 
behaviour and is a more rational and fair approach to ensuring an accused 
receives his or her legislative right to an impartial jury. 
Social psychological research has identified ways in which prejudices, either 
inherent or induced through such influences as publicity, have a negative 
impact upon jury decisions. The research also works towards 
understanding how these prejudices can be reduced to a minimum in jury 
trial settings. It is this writer's opinion that the evidence and examples 
presented here demonstrate that although SJS has limits, it fans the flame 
that shows that freedom lives more convincingly than does traditional jury 
selection. SJS critics accept that it may be more effective than traditional 
methods of jury selection but only in some cases and to a minimal extent. 
165 Above n 138, 90. 
50 
be viewed in terms of a patient with the chance of obtaining "minimally" 
more effective treatment: 166 
The best modern medical drugs improve effective treatment from 50% to 
approximately 56%. Should they be used? Would a patient decline them? 
Would a criminal defendant prefer that his lawyer was 50% rather than 60% 
accurate in judging venireperson bias? 
For counsel who wish to provide their client with the most effective 
"treatment" available the lesson from social science is that jurors are 
potentially, and significantly, biased. And that this bias is not readily 
identifiable from external characteristics. The lesson to be adopted then , 
can be drawn from Cooke P and Phillips LJ. That is, convincing evidence of 
bias, such as a Gallup poll , will need to be presented before the court will 
consider invoking all of the methods, which Parliament have enacted, to 
protect the lamp that shows that freedom lives. 
166 Above n 56 , 77 . 
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VI APPENDICES 
Appendix A Questions proposed by counsel to be put to the jury in 
R v Sanders {1995] 3 NZLR 545. 
1. Have you read newspaper articles or heard radio or television items or 
reports about local gangs or motorcycle groups such as the Road Knights 
or The Devils Henchmen? How has this affected you? 
2. Would knowledge that the accused man is a member of the Road Knights 
Motorcycle Club affect your ability to give him a fair and impartial hearing; 
and to give a true verdict on the evidence you will hear at this trial? 
3. Have you or any member of your immediate family ever had an unpleasant 
experience with a member of any motorcycle club which you feel might 
make it difficult for you to be fair and impartial at this trial? 
4. What view do you have, if any, of the role played by the police in dealing 
with gang issues? 
5. Have you, or your spouse, ever attended a meeting relating to the "Timaru 
gang problem" or taken any public step such as writing to a public official or 
the newspapers about gangs? 
6. Have you ever heard of Charles Score Sanders? If so, what have you 
heard about him? 
7. Do you believe that your safety or financial or physical security or the safety 
or financial or physical security of any member of your family has been 
threatened or could be threatened by gangs such as the Road Knights? 
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Appendix B Questions allowed to be put to the jury in R v Hill (Canada, 
Unreported, Lieff J presiding) 
1. Marital status 
2. Children and their ages 
3. Female children 
4. Juror's place of employment 
5. Duration of employment 
6. Members of family in police department or relatives or close friends in police 
department or work for law enforcement agency 
7. Have you formed any opinion on motorcycle clubs? 
8. Have you read any accounts or seen anything on television or heard 
anything on the radio regarding the case? 
9. Have you discussed the case with anyone? 
10. Have you read anything in newspapers about the case and do you believe 
what you have read? 
11 . Have you formed any opinion as a result of newspaper reports or other 
reports? 
12. Any conclusions as to guilt or innocence of accused? 
13. Having read the newspaper reports , could you give a fair trial? 
14. Are you related to any of the accused - do you have any knowledge of him? 
15. Does your wife work? 
16. Do you know the complainant? 
17. Do you know what the charge is about? 
18. Do you know the Crown attorney? 
19. Do you know the defence counsel? 
20. Would the manner in which the accused lives, if it differs from yours, affect 
your ability to decide? 
21 . Have you ever sat on a jury before? 
22. Would you be influenced by anything you might have heard outside? 
23. Are you only paid when working and not when away? Is it a hardship for 
you to be away? 
24. Would your opinion interfere with your giving a fair trial? 
25. Would the fact that you have an 18-year-old daughter affect your ability on 
a charge of rape? 
26. Would you have to overcome something within yourself to abide by your 
oath? 
27. Do you have any opinions on rape charges? Does the charge cause bias 
or prejudice? 
28. Would you evaluate the testimony of a member of a motorcycle club the 
same way as you would a police officer? 
29. Do you have any feelings about people who associate with motorcyclists? 
30. Having known certain witnesses , would you have difficulty rejecting their 
evidence? 
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